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Birnbaum: Interactive Computing

INTERACTIVE COMPUTING: JOINT WORK
STATUS FOR USER AND PROGRAMMER
Both our inventions meet andjump in one.
William Shakespearel
INTRODUCTION

Until the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,2 the law of
copyright pertaining to telephone directories was uncertain. Feist
resolved the issue of whether the copying of geographical listings
3
from a white pages directory constituted copyright infringement.
The defendant Feist, was a publishing company that distributed
telephone directories over a large geographical area. 4 The plaintiff
Rural, was a public utility that published an ordinary telephone
directory comprised of both white and yellow pages. 5 While
preparing to publish an area-wide directory, Feist requested various
white pages listings from eleven telephone companies, including
6
Rural, and offered to pay each company for the use of its listings.
7
Rural was not interested, and, therefore, declined to assist Feist.
Without Rural's listings, Feist's directory would have been
incomplete; therefore, Feist took the initiative of using Rural's
listings without Rural's permission. 8 This prompted Rural to bring
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TAMING OF THE SHREW act I, sc. I.
2. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
3. Id. at 344. In addition, Feist decided the broader issue of copyright

protection for factually based works, in particular, whether the sweat of the
brow doctrine was valid. Id. at 352-55. The sweat of the brow doctrine afforded
a copyright as a reward for hard work associated with the compilation of facts.
Id. at 352. This doctrine was rejected in Feist because "to accord copyright
protection on this basis alone distorts basic copyright principles in that it creates
a monopoly in public domain materials without the necessary justification of
protecting and encouraging the creation of 'writings' by 'authors."' Id. at 354
(citation omitted).
4. Id. at 342.

5.Id.
6. Id. at 343.
7.Id.
8.Id.

507
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suit for copyright infringement, arguing that "Feist, in compiling
its own directory, could not use the information contained in
Rural's white pages." 9 Feist replied that the copied listings were
not within the scope of copyright protection. 10 The United States
Supreme Court held for Feist, on the ground that Rural's listings
were not copyrightable1 1 because the alphabetical directory of
Rural's white pages lacked the requisite originality under the
12
Copyright Act.
Although this determination demonstrates that an alphabetical
listing of factual information, without more, is not copyrightable,
Feist does not stand for the proposition that a telephone directory
can never be copyrightable. For example, it is possible to devise a
non-alphabetical white pages directory that could actually receive
copyright protection. 13 It appears, however, that there would be
more room for creativity and originality in yellow page listings
because of the greater opportunity for creativity in the design and
14
format of the listings.
Although Feist did not raise this issue, a computer programmer
could design a program to be used to create a new and original way
to display the yellow pages. 15 In fact, a user may employ the
program for this exact purpose, and thus, create a new way to
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 344.
Id.
Id. at 363.
Id. at 363-64.
One may wonder whether this type of directory would be useful since it

is difficult to find information in a directory without any alphabetical format.
14. See, e.g., Bellsouth Advertising and Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Info.
Publishing, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436, 1443 (11th Cir. 1993) (criticizing the lower
court's suggestions for arrangement of the yellow pages including "arrang[ing]
its headings according to the number of advertisers or to list its subscribers
under each heading according to the length of time for which that subscriber
appeared under that heading.. ."); Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today
Publishing Enters., 945 F.2d 509, 514 (1991) ("The format of the Key Directory
is common to most classified directories ....Nevertheless, some of the

categories are of particular interest to the Chinese-American community and not
common to yellow pages ....).

15. The yellow pages were chosen as opposed to the white pages for the
purposes of this hypothetical because there is greater ability to create new
designs, formats, and styles in the yellow pages.
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present the yellow pages. This work, which will be referred to as
"The Yellow Pages," would likely warrant copyright protection;
however, a problem arises as to who would own the copyright. The
possibilities include the user, the programmer, or perhaps a joint
work 16 shared by both.
This Comment, while by no means limited to this particular
hypothetical situation, will discuss the aspects of copyright
protection with respect to a work resulting from a great deal of
input, directly or indirectly, by a user and a programmer. Part I will
explore whether the creator of the computer software or the user of
the software should be given exclusive copyright protection. Part II
will examine the possibility that a joint work, whereby the user and
the programmer share the copyright protection, should be utilized
for protection. This Comment will conclude by finding that a joint
work is most consistent with case law, statutory provisions, and
authoritative opinions.
I. USER AND/OR PROGRAMMER AS AUTHOR
A computer program, like the one which ultimately designed
"The Yellow Pages," may have the potential to produce a creative,
original way to display the yellow pages of a telephone directory,
or some other interactive work. This, however, may arise in one of
three ways, each resulting in a different copyright situation.
First, the software may be designed to request only brief inputs
and suggestions from the user. 17 For instance, one may create
software which selects musical notes randomly after the user
depresses a computer key. 18 This series of notes may create an
16. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). "A 'joint work' is a work prepared by two or
more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into
inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole." Id.
17. See, e.g., Michael Feuer, VLSI Design Automation: An Introduction, 71
PROC. OF THE IEEE 5 (1983).
18. See UNITED STATES CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AsSEsSMENT,
INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY

RIGHTS

IN

AN

AGE

OF

ELECTRONICS

AND

69-73 (1986) [hereinafter OTA REPORT]. This software,
developed by the programmer, selects notes at random from the standard scale
INFORMATION

and uses these notes as variables in a music composing algorithm. Id. at 71. The
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original musical piece. The user, however, did not contribute a
great deal of original expression to the process. This type of
situation suggests that it was the computer, or rather the
programmer, who in fact created the resulting form of expression.
In Feist the Court employed a three part test for determining
originality: "(1) the collection and assembly of pre-existing
material, facts, or data; (2) the selection, coordination, or
arrangement of those materials; and (3) the creation, by virtue of
the particular selection, coordination, or arrangement, of an
'original' work of authorship." 19 Applying this test, the user who
merely depressed a computer key would fail to satisfy the
originality requirements set forth in Feist.
Additionally, the contributions made by the user may be
considered to be de minimis.20 In other words, although the user
did contribute keystrokes, in comparison to the created output, this
contribution is not sufficiently substantial to warrant copyright
protection. It was not this particular user's keystroke that created
the melody. Any keystroke from any user would have produced the
same work. Therefore, the user's contributions would probably not
satisfy even the minimal creativity standard developed in Feist.
Alternatively, the software may be designed to perform its
function without extensive, elaborate, or sophisticated input from
the user.2 1 For example, artists may use the aid of a computer
program to color areas on animation frames. 22 This can
significantly reduce the amount of time needed to create an
program processes the notes into "pleasing harmonic, rhythmic, and thematic
structures." Id.
19. Feist,499 U.S. at 357.
20. For a discussion of Professor Nimmer's de minimis test, see infra notes
113-22 and accompanying text.
21. See Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in ComputerGenerated Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REv. 1185, 1200 n.71 (1986). The author sets
forth an interesting illustration concluding that her paper is still copyrightable
despite the use of a word processing program in writing the paper. Id.
The word
processing program does not add its own originality or expression, so the
programmer will not be able to share in the copyright of her paper. ld; see also
NATIONAL COMM'N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS,

FINAL REPORT 44 (1979) [hereinafter CONTU REPORT].
22. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 21, at 44
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animated work. 23 In this type of program, the user has previously
drawn and designed animation tracks. When the computer assisted
this user, it added certain colors to the tracks which the user had
chosen. In this situation, the user's role would sufficiently satisfy
the originality requirement to obtain a copyright because the
software programmer's contribution would be considered de
minimis. In other words, the program was designed to add colors
only upon request. The programmer's contributions would not
contain the creativity required for copyright protection, and,
therefore, only the user would be entitled to copyright protection in
the completed work.
Finally, the computer software and the user may work
interactively. 24 This interaction may require elaborate inputs on the
part of the user, while the software would consistently add creative
designs to each instruction.
The first two examples illustrate the extremes. The first scenario
shows the programmer of the software solely expressing a given
idea, while the second demonstrates a situation in which the user is
performing all of the expressions of the idea. In both of these
circumstances, the other party's role is minimal. It is a long
standing proposition in copyright law that an idea itself may not be
copyrighted.2 5 Rather, it is the expression of the idea which may
be copyrightable. 26 Therefore, in reference to the first two
scenarios, even if the other party conceived a brilliant idea, that
party would not likely be afforded copyright protection unless
some form of original expression was demonstrated. 27 In the first
situation, it appears that the programmer's software creates
virtually all of the expression. As a result, the programmer would
probably be the only party to obtain a copyright in the completed
23. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 21, at 44.
24. See OTA REPORT, supranote 18, at 69.

25. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1993). "In no case does
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea ... regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work." Id.; Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); Baker v.
Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061 (7th

Cir. 1994).
26. See supranote 25.
27. See supranote 25.
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work. 28 Conversely, in the second situation, the user of the
software is inputting sophisticated data, and in essence, solely
performing the act of expression. Here, only the user should be
entitled to obtain copyright protection. 29
The third scenario, whereby the user works interactively and
fairly equivalently with the programmer's software, is the main
focus of this paper. For the following reasons, these situations
should be viewed as a joint work, and hence, should constitute a
copyright for both the user and the programmer.
A. User
It may be suggested that the user of a computer program
deserves exclusive copyright protection in the completion of a
created work. 3 0 It can be argued that the "user of a generator
program will have been the human instrument of fixation of
computer-generated output and will have often contributed
31
,,
substantially to the originality of expression in such output ....
One commentator provided an argument regarding the user of a
program who composed music. 32 The commentator suggested that
although the program may be able to set forth a series of notes in
various selections, only an experienced musical composer would
know which selections were better than others. 33 Thus, it is the
user who ultimately understands and chooses the piece. 34
While this argument does have some merit, it seems that it is still
the programmer who produced the music in the first place. After
all, a sufficiently experienced and talented user would most likely
not have sought the assistance of the program. Therefore, simply
28. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 2.01, at 2-6 (1994) ("[C]opyright protection subsists only in 'original works of
authorship."').
29. Id.
30. See Samuelson, supra note 21, at 1204.
31. See Samuelson, supra note 21, at 1204.
32. See Samuelson, supra note 21, at 1204.
33. See Samuelson, supra note 21, at 1204.
34. See Samuelson, supra note 21, at 1204 ("It may be that an experienced
composer must use the program in order to create the quality of music that the
programmer had hoped for.").
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because the user would have had the final word in determining
which notes sounded better together, the sequence of notes may not
have existed at all without the help of the program. As a result, the
programmer should not be excluded from copyright protection in
the completed expression.
It has also been argued that the user is in "the best position to
take the initial steps that will bring a work into the marketplace." '35
This argument refers to the incentives and rewards available to
those who bring a completed work into the market for public
knowledge and use. 36 By rewarding the user with copyright
protection in the finished work, users will be encouraged to bring
their work into the public domain. However, for the same reasons,
the programmer should be equally rewarded with copyright
protection. The programmer substantially enabled the production
of the output, and should be encouraged to continue to create and
develop software. A copyright would further this goal by serving
as an incentive for both users and programmers by encouraging
each of them to bring their work into the marketplace.
Concededly, these arguments are strong reasons why a user
should be given a copyright in the work. They fail, however, to
explain why the user should be afforded sole protection. After all,
the programmer of the software is as much a "human instrument"
who "contributed substantially to the originality of expression in
such output" as the user. 37 Without the programmer's software to
assist the user, there might not have been any fixed expression
warranting copyright protection in the first place.
While the user may be in the best position, by definition, to make
use of the software and "bring a work into the marketplace," the
user is only in this position because of the programmer's
contribution of software. Therefore, a user should be entitled to
copyright protection in a work; however, this protection should not
be exclusive to the user.

35. See Samuelson, supra note 21, at 1227.
36. See Samuelson, supra note 21, at 1227 (noting public interest in
availability of such works to the public).
37. See Samuelson, supranote 21, at 1204.
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B. Programmer
It is settled law that computer programs are eligible for copyright
protection. 3 8 One who writes a computer program, such as "The
Yellow Pages," appears to have some legal claim of copyright on
any output produced, since without this program, the generated
work would, in all likelihood, not exist. The programmer encoded
a set of instructions into a computer, setting forth an accessible
means by which to assist a user in the creation of a particular
product. As a result, this program may be able to produce various
creations for many different users. Therefore, in these situations,
the programmer should have a copyright claim on the software.
One critic suggests that a programmer has the option of
withholding the software from the public in order to safely protect
his or her interests. 39 While this may be a valid option, it is
altogether impractical. Programmers typically design such software
to aid others in creating original work and not to withhold it from
the outside world. In fact, the programmer would surely be proud
of the software and hope to market it so that many people would be
able to utilize it. This critic's suggestion also appears to undermine
public policy principles of copyright law, which seek to promote
40
creativity for the public good.
The programmer has a valid interest in a copyright of the
finished work, but it is doubtful that the copyright should be
limited solely to the programmer. As one commentator states,
"[g]ranting all rights to the programmer would mean that the
programmer would automatically own everything the program was
capable of generating. This solution over-rewards the programmer,
particularly in light of the fact that the programmer is no more able
38. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,

1249 (3d Cir. 1983) ("[A] computer program, whether object code or source
"),
code, is a 'literary work' and is protected from unauthorized copying ....
cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); see also Jeffrey Allen Berkowitz,

Comment, 4 TouRo L. REv. 97, 102 (1987) ("[I]t is now settled that computer
programs are within the scope of copyright law protection.").
39. See Samuelson, supra note 21, at 1207.
40. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975) (stating that the objective of copyright law is to "serve the cause of
promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts").
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to anticipate the output than anyone else." 4 1 An exclusive right to
the program and in everything generated by the computer would
not be fair, assuming someone else's input caused the resulting
output. While the programmer appears to be a valid candidate to
own the copyright, the programmer does not seem solely deserving
of the copyright. Therefore, a suggested solution to this dilemma is
to establish joint copyright protection for both the user and the
programmer.
II. BOTH USER AND PROGRAMMER IN A JOINT

WORK
Joint authors of a joint work hold undivided interests in the
whole of a given work, regardless of the proportion of their
individual contributions. 4 2 Therefore, even if one party's
individual contribution is relatively minor, once joint authorship is
achieved, the benefits to both authors are significant. 43 To reap the
benefits of a joint work copyright, both creators must first be
established as "authors." 44 The United States Supreme Court
defined the term author as "the party who actually creates the
work, that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed,
45
tangible expression entitled to copyright protection."
In determining whether joint authorship exists, courts consider
two factors: intent and contribution. First, courts examine whether
the parties intended, at the time of creating their work, that their
work would be merged with another person's work. 4 6 Second, the
47
courts inquire into the actual contribution of each party.
41. See Samuelson, supra note 21, at 1208.

42. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1988). This provision provides in pertinent part:
"The authors of ajoint work are coowners of copyright in the work." Id
43. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485,
1498 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating that absent an agreement to the contrary, profits
earned by joint work are shared equally although authors' contributions to the
work are not equal), aff'd on other grounds, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
44. See Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1069 (7th Cir.
1994).
45. Reid, 490 U.S. at 737.
46. See generally infra notes 48-112 and accompanying text.
47. See generally infra notes 113-35 and accompanying text.
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A. Intent of Parties
1. Relevant Case Law
One way in which a joint work will arise is when the work has
resulted from joint authorship. 4 8 Joint authors share the copyright
given to their joint work. 49 To become a joint author, an individual
must intend his or her work to eventually be merged with another's
work. 50 Once this intent is duly established, there is no
requirement that the joint authors work together in creating their
expression. Further, copyright protection may still ensue "even if
they are complete strangers to each other."' 5 1 This general
proposition remains true so long as each individual speculates that
his or her particular work will be combined with another to form a
whole. 52 Additionally, a joint owner of a copyright cannot be
53
liable to a co-owner for copyright infringement.
An example of this is shown in the case of Edward B. Marks
Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co.54 In Marks, a composer
55
wrote lyrics for a song and sold these lyrics to a song publisher.
This publisher subsequently hired a music composer to produce
48. See 1 NIMMER& NIMMER, supranote 28, § 6.01, at 6-3.
49. See 17 U.S.C. §201(a) (1988). "The authors of a joint work are
coowners of copyright in the work." Id.
50. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
51. See I NIMMER & NiMMER, supra note 28, § 6.03, at 6-7; see also
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 161 F.2d 406, 410 (2d Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 820 (1947); Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v.
Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266, 267 (2d Cir. 1944); Words & Data, Inc. v.
GTE Common Servs., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 570, 575 (W.D. Mo. 1991); Donna v.
Dodd, Mead & Co., 374 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
52. See Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1319 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 883 (1989) ("[A] finding of joint authorship requires that each
author intend his or her contribution, at the time that it is created, to become part
of a unitary work to which another will make or already has made a
contribution.").
53. Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266,
266 (2d Cir. 1944).

54. Id.
55. Id.
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music for these words. 56 A copyright was later secured in this
musical work, including the lyrics and the music. 57 The lyric
writer and the music composer did not know one another and had
not worked together to obtain this finished product. 58 Each,
however, at the time of creating the individual project, intended
59
that each work would be combined with an additional work.
Judge Learned Hand, writing for the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that "it makes no difference
whether the authors work in concert, or even whether they know
each other; it is enough that they mean their contributions to be
complementary in the sense that they are to be embodied in a
single work to be performed as such."' 60 Judge Hand explained that
although each work could exist separately, if the purpose was to
61
combine the works, then a joint work has been established.
Therefore, since the two parties were found to be joint authors,
62
there was no copyright infringement.
Thirty years later, relying on Marks, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York decided the case of
Donna v. Dodd, Mead & Co.63 The plaintiff had written the text of
56. Id

57. Id The copyright was secured upon the work as a "musical
composition." Id
58. Id
59. Id.
60. Id at 267.
61. Id ("[T]heir separate interests will be as inextricably involved, as are
the threads out of which they have woven the seamless fabric of the work.").
62. Id at 266. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 221

F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1955). In Shapiro, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit found that since the original author transferred his rights to the
music company, the music company's intent was controlling. Id at 570. Thus,
even though the original composer had no intention for the music to acquire
lyrics, it was sufficient that his assignee had such an intent. Id But see REG.
SuPp. REP. 65 (1976). It is important to note that this extension of Markl is not
accepted by the Copyright Act of 1976. Id The Register Supplement Report
states that the definition of "joint work" in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) "carries out
the recommendation of the 1961 Report, which took the position that under the
present law the courts have broadened the concept ofjoint authorship beyond its
reasonable limits." Id.
63. 374 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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a children's book while the defendant provided illustrative photos
for the book.64 Thereafter, using virtually the same format of the
original book, the defendant and his wife created and published
three new books based primarily on the first one. 65 The plaintiff
brought suit against the defendant claiming, among other things,
copyright infringement of the original book. 66 The defendant
responded that this was not a valid cause of action because the
plaintiff and the defendant were actually joint owners of the
67
copyrighted work.
The court noted that at one time, in order to establish a joint
work, it was necessary to find "a common design which existed
'68 This
before the elements of the work were produced."
requirement, however, has since deteriorated. 69 Thus, in applying
Marks and Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co.,70
the district court in Donna found that the original book was in fact
a joint work. 7 1 The defendant may not have had the plaintiffs
book in mind when photographing the pictures, however, these
pictures were intended from the beginning to be merged with
another source and become a joint work. 72 Based on this
reasoning, the court dismissed the plaintiffs claim for copyright
73
infringement.

64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id. at 429-30.
Id. at 430.
Id.

68. Id, (citing 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 28, § 6.03, at 6-9).
69. Donna, 374 F. Supp. at 430. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry
Vogel Music Co., 161 F.2d 406, 410 (2d Cir. 1946) (stating that just because a
composer of music expected one person to write lyrics does not make the song
any less a "joint work" when the lyrics are ultimately written by another), cer.
denied, 331 U.S. 820 (1947); Marks, 140 F.2d at 267 (stating that "it makes no
difference whether the authors work in concert, or even whether they know each
other; it is enough that they mean their contributions to be complementary in the
sense that they are to be embodied in a single work to be performed as such").
70. 221 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1955).
71. Donna, 374 F. Supp. at 430.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 431.
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In Boggs v. Japp,7 4 the issue before the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia was whether a writer and
75
an illustrator of a children's cookbook were joint authors.
Although the facts of the case were in dispute, the court determined
that the defendant, in preparing a cookbook, asked the plaintiff to
76
illustrate certain pictures and submit handwriting samples. The
defendant, however, decided not to use the plaintiffs illustrations,
and used other submissions in their place. 7 7 The plaintiff brought
suit claiming that she and the defendant were joint authors of the
book because she assisted in creating the characters, illustrations,
78
and plot, and that the plot was originally her idea.
The court first explained that the plaintiff was unsuccessful in
truthfully setting forth her claims. 7 9 Additionally, even if the
claims were true, the court found that the plaintiff would still not
be considered a joint author.8 0 The plaintiff only had ideas, which
are not copyrightable. 8 1 Moreover, these ideas, according to the
evidence presented, were not even used in the book. 8 2 The court
stated that "[t]here [was] no evidence that the parties ever intended
that they be co-authors."' 8 3 As a result, the court held that the
84
plaintiff and the defendant were not joint authors.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida found that joint authorship did not exist in the case of
Designer's View, Inc. v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc. 8 5 In this case,
plaintiff was in the business of designing and creating stained glass
74. 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1040 (E.D. Va. 1988).
75. Id. at 1041.
76. Id. at 1042-43.
77. Id.at 1043.
78. Id.at 1044.
79. Id. at 1043.
80. Id. at 1044.
81. Id. (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954)). See 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (1988). "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea... regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." Id.
82. Boggs, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1044.
83. Id.
84. Id.
at 1046.
85. 764 F. Supp. 1473, 1477 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
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panels. 86 Defendant discussed with plaintiff the possibility of
plaintiff's manufacturing stained glass panels for defendant's
store. 87 Defendant suggested an idea and drew a sketch for
plaintiff to use in the process. 88 The parties agreed on the designs
and, soon after, plaintiffs panels were installed. 89 Plaintiff
subsequently applied for and received copyrights for the panels. 90
Plaintiff and defendant later terminated their employment
agreement, and defendant hired a new company essentially to copy
plaintiff's panels. 9 1 Plaintiff then sued defendant for copyright
infringement. 92 As a defense, defendant claimed to be a co-owner
of the copyright in the panels due to the sketches and ideas given to
93
the plaintiff.
The court stated that joint authorship had not been established in
the panels. 94 Specifically, the court noted that "there [was]
insufficient evidence to support Defendant['s] contention that the
cursory sketch... was intended to form an 'inseparable or
interdependent' part of the... panels or that it constituted anything
more than a de minim[i]s contribution."' 95 Additionally, the court
did not hear any evidence that the two parties actually collaborated
in designing the panels. 96 Therefore, plaintiffs copyright was
97
valid and defendant had not acquired any rights in it.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 1475.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

91. Id. at 1476. Defendant wanted the new company to design panels

containing the same subject matter as plaintiffs designs, consisting of the "same
medium of painted acrylic on translucent plastic." Id.
92. Id. The plaintiff subsequently added the new company as a defendant
under the same legal theories as those which had been asserted against the
original defendant.
93. Id. at 1477.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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2. Intent Analysis
From the foregoing case law, we see very important trends. It is
apparent that the intent of the parties at the time of creation may be
determinative in a case involving joint authorship. For instance, in
the Marks case, the court examined the purpose that the creator had
in mind while creating the work, and found that if the purpose was
to be combined with the work of another, then the intent had been
satisfied. 98 Although this case was decided prior to 1976, the
Copyright Act of 197699 clearly stresses the importance of the
parties' intent. 10 0 Since the Act was established, it has been stated
that, to form a joint authorship, each author "must intend to
contribute to ajoint work at the time his or her alleged contribution
is made." 10 1
In "The Yellow Pages," the requisite intent would exist for the
user as well as for the programmer. The user, most likely,
purchased the software with one specific intent in mind - to create
an original way to design the yellow pages. In addition, the
programmer's original intent was to create a program that would
assist a given user in arranging an original format for the yellow
pages.
Assuming that such a result is produced, it cannot legitimately be
argued that the user did not have the intent to merge her creativity
with that of the software. After all, if the user wanted to create an
original work, he or she would not have used the software as an
aid. Rather, the user would have designed the work alone, without
any assistance. The fact that the user voluntarily used the software
to help produce a desired result should play a large role in
determining the user's intent of joint authorship. Here, the user
98. Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266,
267 (2d Cir. 1944) (finding joint authorship where parties intended lyrics and
music of a song to be "enjoyed and performed together").
99. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
100. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). "A 'joint work' is a work prepared by two or
more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into
inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole." Id. (emphasis added).
101. See Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1318 (2d Cir.) (considering
each author's contribution and intent to contribute as criteria when determining
joint authorship), cert. denied,493 U.S. 883 (1989).
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clearly intended to merge his or her work with the software created
by the programmer.
The programmer also possesses the requisite intent for a joint
authorship. The programmer encoded a set of instructions with a
specific intent in mind - to aid an unknown user, or many users, in
designing an original display of the yellow pages. If the
programmer was simply seeking to use the program alone, then
only the programmer would receive copyright protection, if it was
never available for public use. However, the programmer in "The
Yellow Pages" actually wrote the program with the intent that it
would be released for public use. In other words, the programmer
clearly intended the program to be merged with some unforeseen
expression of a given user. This intent, therefore, should be
controlling.
Many of the cases discussed above are instructive in analyzing
the intent of the parties. For instance, in Marks, the two authors did
not work together, yet joint authorship was found. 102 Likewise, in
"The Yellow Pages," the two authors did not work together in
producing their completed work. According to the Marks court,
there is no requirement that the two authors work in concert. 103
Instead, the Marks court noted that intent to create a joint work was
necessary, and found this intent in existence since each party at the
time of creation, intended his or her own work to be combined with
the work of another. 104 Similarly, in Donna, the court found joint
authorship because at the time certain pictures were taken, they
were intended to be combined with another source. 105 Therefore,
under the reasoning of Marks and Donna, "The Yellow Pages"
should be considered a joint work, because both the user and the
programmer, at the time of creation, intended that his or her
102. Marks, 140 F.2d at 267 (finding joint authorship in song where music
and lyrics were composed separately).

103. Id.
104. Id. The court noted that "each [party] knew that his part [of the song]
could be used separately; the words as a 'lyric'; the melody as music."
However, the court reasoned that this "was not their purpose; the words and the
music were to be enjoyed and performed together ..... Id.
105. Donna v. Dodd, Mead & Co., 374 F. Supp. 429, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(stating that although photographs were not taken with specific text in mind,
they were intended to become joint work with some text from another source).
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creation would be merged with the work of another to produce a
unitary whole. Thus, it appears that under both Marks and Donna,
joint authorship in "The Yellow Pages" is clearly established.
The Boggs court found that joint authorship did not exist,
primarily because the plaintiff had only submitted ideas and
nothing more. 106 The court, however, noted that the intent of the
parties to become co-authors is the important inquiry. 107 Although
there was no evidence to support such intent in Boggs, 108 this
court would likely find such intent present in "The Yellow Pages."
First, in "The Yellow Pages," neither party is attempting to obtain
a copyright in an idea. Rather, both the user and the programmer
have created a fixed, tangible medium of expression. Second, the
intent is present because both parties intended that their individual
works would later be merged. In addition, each of their works
would be meaningless alone.
In Designer's View, the court examined the parties' intent to
establish ajoint work, but found that no such intent existed. 109 The
defendant merely suggested an idea and submitted a sketch for the
plaintiff to use in the work. I 10 The court found this showing was
11
insufficient to establish the intent needed for joint authorship. '
According to the court in Designers View, the defendant had not
proven that his sketch was intended to be merged with plaintiffs
work. 112 The Designer's View court would likely find that the
intent did exist in "The Yellow Pages" hypothetical. Both parties
106. Boggs v. Japp, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1040, 1044 (E.D. Va. 1988). See Baker v.
Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104-05 (1879) (stating that an idea itself is not
copyrightable but expression of the idea is copyrightable).
107. Boggs, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1044 (stressing intent to be joint author "since
'the essence of joint authorship is a joint laboring in furtherance of a
preconcerted common design'

... ")

(citation omitted).

108. Id (finding no evidence of intent to be a co-author where there was no
contract or agreement between the parties).
109. Designer's View, Inc. v. Publix Supermarkets., 764 F. Supp. 1473,
1477 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
110. Id
111. Id (finding "cursory sketch" showed nothing more than "de mininf[i]s
contribution" to the finished work).
112. Id (finding no co-authorship where sketch was not intended to form an
"inseparable or interdependent" part of the complete work).
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have enough evidence to show that each intended the individual
work to be merged with someone else's unforeseen work. Thus,
under Designer's View as well, the requisite intent for a joint work
would undoubtedly be found in "The Yellow Pages."
B. Contributionof the Parties
1. Professor Nimmer's De Minimis Standard
In his renowned treatise, the late Professor Nimmer1 13 stated that
in order for joint authorship to ensue, each contribution to the work
must be more than de minimis. 1 14 Nimmer defined "de minimis"
as "more than a word or a line must be added by one who claims to
be a joint author."' 115 According to Nimmer, if one's contribution
is limited to ideas which are incorporated in the resulting work,
then this individual should obtain copyright protection. 116 Courts,
however, have been reluctant to adopt Professor Nimmer's
standard. 117 In Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 118 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated several
reasons why courts are reluctant to follow the standard. 1 19 First of
all, the standard is inconsistent with the Copyright Act of 1976
which states that "ideas and concepts standing alone should not
113. Melville B. Nimmer was a Professor of Law at U.C.L.A. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has referred to him as "[t]he
leading commentator in the field [of copyright law]." Computer Assocs. Int'l,
Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 705 (2d Cir. 1992).
114. See I NIMMER& NIMMER, supranote 28, § 6.07.
115. See I NIMMER & NIMMER, supranote 28, § 6.07.
116. See I NIMMER & NIMMER, supranote 28, § 6.07.
117. See, e.g., Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1071 (7th Cir.
1994) (requiring a showing that contributions were "independently
copyrightable"); Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1990)
(holding "joint authorship requires each author to make an independently

copyrightable contribution"). But see Community For Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (supporting Nimmer's standard

where one qualifies as a joint author even if contribution alone would not be
copyrightable).

118. 13 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1994).
119. Id. at 1070.
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receive protection." 120 The Act promotes creativity and therefore,
any restriction on an author's use of suggestions or existing ideas
would inhibit creativity. 12 1 Second, the court found that the
concept of contributing an idea expressed in Nimmer's test is
unclear and that the test fails to set forth any helpful guidelines to
follow.122

If a court did choose to adopt this standard for authorship, "The
Yellow Pages" hypothetical would clearly satisfy this test. Neither
contribution is de minimis. The programmer wrote a program
which is a substantial piece of work. Likewise, the user added
certain expressions to the work which would also be considered
more than a de minimis contribution. Moreover, neither of these
contributions is merely an idea, but even if one was, each would
still be copyrightable under this standard. Since both contributions
are more than de minimis, both the user and the programmer would
likely be considered "authors."
2. Professor Goldstein's Copyrightability Test
According to Professor Goldstein, 123 "a contribution will not
obtain a co-ownership interest, unless the contribution represents
original expression that could stand on its own as the subject
matter of copyright." 124 Many courts have utilized this rule, in
some form, when deciding the issue of joint ownership. 12 5 For

120. Id.

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Professor Paul Goldstein is a Stella W. & Ira S. Lillick Professor at

Stanford Law School.
124. 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES, LAW & PRACTICE
§ 4.2.1.2 (1989).
125. See Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1071 (requiring a showing that contributions
were "independently copyrightable"); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507

(2d Cir. 1991) ("It seems more consistent with the spirit of copyright law to
oblige all joint authors to make copyrightable contributions, leaving those with
non-copyrightable contributions to protect their rights through contract.");
Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that
"joint authorship requires each author to make an independently copyrightable
contribution"); Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847, 857 (D.N.J. 1981) (holding
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example, the Erickson court adopted the Goldstein test because it is
consistent with the language of the Copyright Act of 1976.126 If a
court were to apply Goldstein's test, "The Yellow Pages"
contributors would certainly meet the authorship standard. Each
contributor has created a work, which, standing alone, would be
copyrightable.
The Copyright Act of 1976 includes in its definition section the
definition of a computer program. 127 Additionally, under section
102 of the Copyright Act' 2 8 many courts have found that computer
programs are copyrightable subject matter. 129 For example, in
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,130 the court
noted that "literary works" need not be restricted to literature, and
concluded that a computer program is a literary work which can
obtain copyright protection.13 1 Therefore, the software alone
would be entitled to copyright protection. 132 The program would
likely be deemed "original expression that could stand on its
own." 13 3

The user, however, seems to pose a larger problem because if all
of the user's expression is merely input into the computer, it is
ideas and sketches were not "fixed expressions of ideas" and therefore, not
copyrightable).
126. Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1071.

127. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). "A 'computer program' is a set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring
about a certain result." Id.
128. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988). Section 102(a) provides in pertinent part:
"Copyright protection subsists in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device .... "Id.
129. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d
1240, 1248 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that computer programs are copyrightable

and are afforded copyright protection); Wheelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental
Lab. Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1320 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (finding a valid copyright in
a computer program used in a dental laboratory), affd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.
1986).

130.
131.
132.
133.

714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1253-54.
Id.
See I GOLDSTEIN, supra note 124, § 4.2.1.2.
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difficult to decipher the fixed tangible expression from that which
is not. However, this problem is not unworkable. In order for the
program to successfully run, the user must input certain
expressions. These expressions, of words or of a language that a
computer is able to comprehend, should be independently
copyrightable since the user will most likely have to input words to
make the software run. These words, including their exact order
and sequence, should be entitled to constitute copyright
protection. 134 The user will need to express the words more
creatively than, for instance, alphabetical order; 135 however, very
few additional alterations will be necessary to meet the
requirements of Goldstein's test.
CONCLUSION

According to case law, statutory interpretations, and
commentators, "The Yellow Pages" would constitute a joint work.
A court deciding an issue dealing with interactive computing
should examine the parties' intent at the time of individual creation
of the work, and each party's contribution to the resulting whole.
As this Comment suggests, when the intent of the parties
demonstrates that an individual work should ultimately merge with
the work of another, and the contribution meets the requirements of
either Professor Nimmer or Professor Goldstein, then the parties
should be afforded copyright protection in the form of a joint work.
Thus, both parties would enjoy the protection in a work which they
substantially helped to bring into the marketplace.
Michelle Lynn Birnbaum

134. See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
357 (1991).
135. Id.
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